

#### 9 Low-Level Coding Flaws

## Topics

- Arithmetic Vulnerabilities
  - Fixed-Width Integer Vulnerabilities
  - Floating-Point Precision Vulnerabilities
  - Example: Floating-Point Underflow
  - Example: Integer Overflow
  - Safe Arithmetic

## Topics

- Memory Access Vulnerabilities
  - Memory Management
  - Buffer Overflow
  - Example: Memory Allocation Vulnerabilities
  - Case Study: Heartbleed

#### **Arithmetic Vulnerabilities**

#### **Fixed-Width Integer Vulnerabilities**

- 16-bit integer
- Possible values from
  - 0000 0000 0000 0000 = 0
  - to
  - 1111 1111 1111 1111 =  $65,535 = 2^{16} 1$
- Multiply 300 x 300 = 90,000
  - 24,464 in a 16-bit integer
  - 65, 536 + 24,464

# 

Now let's see how to multiply 300 times itself in binary (Figure 9-2).

#### 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 000000100101100 ×000000100101100 00 00000100101100 000000100101100 00000000100101100 00000001**00101100**

#### 010111110010000

#### **Consequences of Integer Overflows**

- Buffer overflow
- Incorrect comparison of values
- Giving a credit instead of charging for a sale
- etc.

#### How \$800k Evaporated from the PoWH Coin Ponzi Scheme Overnight



Eric Banisadr · Follow 4 min read · Feb 1, 2018


- A flaw in the smart contract allowed an attacker to subtract 1 coin from a wallet containing zero coins
- The resulting balance: 2256 1

0: uint256: 115792089237316195423570985008687907853 269984665640564039457584007913129639935

۲	DEPLOY & RU	IN TRANSACTIONS 🗏
ආ	transfer	address _to, uint256 _value 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸
5	transferFrom	^
21	_from:	0xEe99fF0f773C72bB24501c2
	_to:	0x8B68C8296E43f64c02da5ac
~	_value:	1
305 -îîf-		🗘 transact
<b>%</b>	withdraw	uint256 tokenCount
sv	withdrawOld	address to 🗸 🗸 🗸
ý	allowance	address , address 🗸 🗸 🗸
	balanceOf	address _owner 🗸 🗸 🗸
	balanceOfOld	0x921f4c6e8d6Ba44642C3( 🛛 🗸
		0: uint256: 16195423570985008687907853 64039457584007913129639935

#### **Avoiding Integer Overflows and Underflows**

- Use an integer size larger than the largest allowable value
  - Preceded by checks ensuring that invalid values never sneak in
- When multiplying two 16-bit numbers, put the result in a 32-bit number
- Or use memory-safe languages like Rust



#### **Floating-Point Precision Vulnerabilities**

- Numbers like 1.543E23
  - 1,543 x 10<sup>23</sup>
- Three parts
  - A sign bit (+ or -)
  - A fraction (15 digits in precision)
  - An exponent

## **Tiny Errors**

- 0.1 + 0.2 will yield 0.30000000000000004
- Solutions
  - Use integer arithmetic (good for money, count pennies)
  - Don't use (x == y) for floating points
  - Use (x > y delta && x < y + delta)</li>
  - Or the Python function math.isclose()

#### **Example: Floating-Point Underflow**

- Floating point numbers only have a limited number of decimal places of precision
- The 1 is lost, below that precision level

#### Solution

- Limit the values to a maximum that's safe
- Such as 1E10

🧕 😑 🛑 sambowne — Python — 31×7	
>>> 100 + 1 - 100	
1 >>> 1E10 + 1 - 1E10	
1.0	
>>> 1E20 + 1 - 1E20	
0.0	
>>>	

## **Example: Integer Overflow**


- To calculate hourly pay in C
  - Use 32-bit integers (maximum 4 billion)
- Code time as millihours (8000 = 8 hours)
- Dollar values in cents (\$400 = 40,000 cents, the maximum possible pay)
- A week's work would be 40 hours
  - 40,000 millihours x 40,000 cents = 1,600,000,000
  - Very close to the limit
  - Adding overtime pay can easily exceed 32-bit limit
- This task requires 64-bit integers

#### Safe Arithmetic

- Avoid using tricky code to handle overflow problems
  - Mistakes will be hard to find
  - And tricks may depend on the implementation on your machine

#### Safe Arithmetic

- Be careful using type conversions that can potentially truncate or distort results, just as calculations can.
- Where possible, constrain inputs to the computation to ensure that all possible values are representable.
- Use a larger fixed-size integer to avoid possible overflow; check that the result is within bounds before converting it back to a smaller-sized integer.
- Remember that intermediate computed values may overflow, causing a problem, even if the final result is always within range.
- Use extra care when checking the correctness of arithmetic in and around security-sensitive code.



https://www.destroyallsoftware.com/talks/wat

#### **Memory Access Vulnerabilities**

## Memory Management

- Pointers allow direct access to memory by address
  - A powerful, but dangerous, feature of C
- alloc() reserves memory on the heap
- free() frees it

#### **Correct Heap Usage**

```
uint8 t *p;
// Don't use the pointer
// before allocating memory for it.
p = malloc(100); // Allocate 100 bytes
                  // before first use.
p[0] = 1;
p[99] = 123 + p[0];
free(p);
                  // Release the memory
                  // after last use.
```

// Don't use the pointer anymore.

## **Vulnerabilities**

- Dangling pointer
  - Can read or write to pointer after it's freed, or no longer intended to be used
- Double-free
  - Second free operation causes improper, dangerous write operations

#### **Buffer Overflow**

- Can write outside reserved memory
- Allows code injection

#### **Example: Memory Allocation Vulnerabilities**

- C data structure
- Writing data to username 12 can make someone an admin

```
#define MAX_USERNAME_LEN 39
#define SETTINGS_COUNT 10
typedef struct {
   bool isAdmin;
   long userid;
   char username[MAX_USERNAME_LEN + 1];
   long setting[SETTINGS_COUNT];
} user_account;
```

# Leaking Memory

- **alloc()** does not initialize memory
- It contains leftover data from previous heap data
- This can leak out information
- Mitigation
- Write zeroes to whole data structure before use

1 byte 4 bytes	isAdmin	(unused)
4 bytes	userid	
40 bytes		username
40 bytes		settings[10]

#### strcpy


- Copies the source string, up to its null terminator
  - Into the destination string
- May copy a long string into a shorter one, overflowing its buffer
- May copy a short string into a longer one, leaving bytes uninitialized

#### strncpy

- Copies only a limited number of bytes from one string to another
- BUT does not ensure a null terminator in the destination string
- May expose data past the end of the destination string


## **Case Study: Heartbleed**

- Flaw in the openssl implementation of the TLS Heartbeat Extension
- Client sends a message to the server, which echoes it back



## **Case Study: Heartbleed**

- BUT openssl trusted the length parameter in the request, without verifying it
- So send a short message with a long length
  - The server replies with a large chunk of uninitiaized memory



#### Remediation

- Compare the length parameter with the length of the actual data provided
  - If they are not the same, ignore the request



**Ch 9**