

## CHAPTER 6

# Disk Imaging

# Chapter Overview

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# Protecting Evidence Integrity

Forensic soundness from the start

# Protecting the Integrity of Evidence

**Forensic soundness:** the image is an exact, verifiable copy — nothing added or changed

**Hash the source BEFORE imaging:** MD5 or SHA-256 of the physical drive

**Hash the image AFTER:** source hash == image hash proves integrity

**Write blockers:** hardware or software that prevents ANY write to source media

**Chain of custody:** document who had evidence, when, and what was done

Never boot the original disk — even BIOS/UEFI writes can modify data

Document tool versions, command lines, and timestamps for every action



*A portable Tableau write-blocker attached to a hard drive (from Wikipedia)*

# dd, dcfldd, and dc3dd Command Syntax

**dd:** `if=/dev/sda of=/mnt/usb/sda.dd bs=4M` — sector-by-sector copy with 4 MB block size  
`conv=noerror,sync:` continue on read errors; pad bad sectors with zeros

**dcfldd:** `dd` + on-the-fly hashing (`md5log=` / `sha256log=`) and progress reporting

**dc3dd:** improved; `log=` for output log, `hash=sha256`, `bufsz` for performance tuning

**Verify after imaging:** `dd if=sda.dd | sha256sum` — compare to source hash

**Network pipe:** `dd if=/dev/sda | ssh responder@10.1.1.5 'cat > image.dd'`

**Netcat:** `dd if=/dev/sda | nc -l -p 9999` on source; `nc 10.1.1.1 9999 > image.dd` over network to destination

Always run a final hash comparison — never assume the image is identical to source

# Image Format Comparison — Raw vs. E01 vs. AFF4

**Raw (dd):** exact byte-for-byte copy, no metadata, widest tool support

**E01 (Expert Witness Format):** segments, built-in hash, metadata, compression — industry standard

**E01 tools:** FTK Imager, EnCase, ewfacquire (libewf) — most forensic tools support E01

**AFF4 (Advanced Forensic File Format 4):** modern standard, strong crypto, sparse images

**E01 vs raw:** E01 preferred in legal proceedings (hash + metadata inside the format)

**Size:** E01 with compression ~50–60% of raw size

**Mounting:** mmount (raw), ewfmount (E01) — all create read-only loop device

Choose format based on legal requirements, tool compatibility, and storage constraints

# Dead-Box Imaging

Imaging a powered-off system

# Hardware Write Blockers & Bootable Linux

## Hardware Write Blockers

Tableau (OpenText) and WiebeTech — industry standard

Block all write commands at hardware level

Works for SATA, IDE, USB, SAS, NVMe

Preferred for court-admissible forensic images

LED indicator confirms write-block is active

## Bootable Linux Tools

**SIFT Workstation (SANS)**: comprehensive forensics distro

**Paladin (Sumuri)**: user-friendly, automatic write-blocking

**CAINE**: Italian forensics distro with extensive tool set

**dd**: low-level block copy — `dd if=/dev/sda of=/mnt/image.dd`

**dcfldd / dc3dd**: add hashing and progress to dd

# Evidence Labeling & Documentation

**Every piece of evidence receives a unique identifier:** CASE-YYYY-MM-DD-ITEM-NNN

**Label must include:** case number, item number, description, date/time, collector name

**Photograph evidence before and after:** shows condition on receipt

**Tamper-evident evidence bags:** seal and sign across seam — any opening is visible

**Chain of custody form:** every transfer must be signed by both parties

**Store imaging logs with the image:** tool name, version, command, hash values, timestamps

**Write-blocker serial number and calibration date:** documents hardware used for court

Never write case notes on physical media — use separate documentation system

# Recovering Deleted Files

Whole-disk image includes **latent data**

- Deleted files and file fragments

- But not for modern SSD's, only for magnetic hard drives

Live imaging only copies **active data**

- Files in use, with **metadata**: creation time, filename, owner

# Live Imaging

Imaging a powered-on system

# Why Use Live Imaging

Faster and easier

Standard for incident response

Works on encrypted drives

# Live Imaging Methods

## Live Imaging Locally

**FTK Imager:** GUI-based, supports E01/AD1 formats

Create image to external media, never to local disk

Captures slack space, unallocated space, and metadata

Can copy selected files, or a whole hard disk

## Remote Live Imaging

**dd piped over network:** `dd if=/dev/sda | ssh user@server 'cat > image.dd'`

**FTK Imager CLI:** `ftkimager \\.\PhysicalDrive0 \share\image`

**Velociraptor:** artifact-based remote acquisition

**Bandwidth-intensive:** schedule for off-peak hours

# Verifying Image Integrity

**Primary verification:** source hash == image hash computed immediately after acquisition

**Block-level verification:** compare hash of every sector (detects partial corruption)

**FTK Imager:** computes hash during acquisition and stores it in .E01 metadata block

**Verify after transport:** re-hash image at destination — mismatch invalidates evidence

**Dual storage:** write image to two separate drives simultaneously, compare hashes

**Tools:** md5sum, sha256sum, certutil -hashfile (Windows), hashdeep (recursive directory)

Document all hashes in the case log with timestamp and tool version

Hash mismatch is not always tampering — could be bad media; document and investigate

Hashes are often affected by the live imaging process

Because RAM contents, timestamps, logs, etc. are altered by the imaging tool

# Imaging Speed Factors & Best Practices

**Interface speed:** USB 3.0 ~400 MB/s, SATA III ~550 MB/s, NVMe ~3,500 MB/s

**Source drive health:** bad sectors slow imaging dramatically — conv=noerror,sync to continue

**Destination speed:** slow USB drive is often the bottleneck, not the source

**Network imaging:** 1 Gbps = ~125 MB/s; a 1 TB drive takes ~2.2 hours

**Compression on-the-fly:** reduces transfer time but adds CPU overhead

**Prioritize:** partial images of key partitions if time is limited

Always check destination space before starting — imaging fails partway if it fills up

Document start time and end time to establish collection window for chain of custody

# Imaging Virtual Machines

Take a hypervisor snapshot BEFORE any triage activity

**VMware:** acquire .vmdk file from datastore (copy, don't run)

**Hyper-V:** export VM — includes .vhd/.vhdx and memory state

Snapshot includes memory state if VM is running — valuable evidence

Mount .vmdk/.vhd in forensic tool as read-only

**Cloud VMs:** use provider snapshot APIs (AWS, Azure, GCP)

Avoid powering off cloud VMs — coordinate with cloud team first

# Cloud VM Forensics — AWS, Azure, GCP

**Do NOT power off:** volatile state, network connections, and memory are lost forever

**AWS:** create EBS snapshot via API — forensic copy in seconds without touching the VM

**Azure:** take managed disk snapshot — mount as read-only in a separate forensic VM

**GCP:** create persistent disk snapshot — attach to forensic instance in same region

**Memory:** no direct access; use cloud-provided memory dump APIs or agent-based tools

**Logs:** VPC Flow Logs, CloudTrail (AWS), Azure Monitor, GCP Cloud Audit Logs

**EC2 SSM:** run commands on running instances without SSH — equivalent to WMIC

**Legal hold:** configure deletion protection on snapshot before forensic work begins

# Selective Collection & Common Mistakes

**Targeted collection:** copy only forensically relevant files when full imaging is impractical

**KAPE targets:** Event Logs, Registry hives, Prefetch, Amcache, SRUM, Browser data

**Limitation:** targeted collection may miss slack space and deleted files

Document what was and was not collected — scope limitations matter for court

**Common mistake:** writing to the suspect disk — contaminates evidence immediately

**Common mistake:** skipping hash verification — unverified images cannot prove integrity

If you cannot verify hashes, explain why

**Common mistake:** booting the original disk — BIOS/UEFI writes modify timestamps

**Common mistake:** not checking destination space — imaging fails mid-way with no warning

# If You Make a Mistake

**Document** what happened, and why

**NEVER** lie or conceal a mistake

The cover-up is worse than the crime



# Write Blockers — Software vs. Hardware

**Hardware write blockers:** gold standard — block writes at the physical bus level

**Software write blockers:** OS-level policy that redirects write attempts — faster to deploy

**Windows:** registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\StorageDevicePolicies\WriteProtect = 1

**Linux:** hdparm -r1 /dev/sdb — set device read-only before mounting

**PALADIN:** automatically mounts all drives read-only at boot — no manual steps needed

**Risk:** software write blockers can be defeated by kernel bugs or misconfiguration

**Court standard:** hardware write blocker with documented serial number and calibration date

Always verify write protection is active before mounting source media

# Conclusion

Hash before and after imaging — non-matching hashes may invalidate evidence

Hardware write blockers are the gold standard for dead-box forensics

VM snapshots are powerful — they capture both disk and memory state

Cloud forensics requires API-based snapshots — no physical access available

Proper documentation of every step protects evidence in legal proceedings

# Knowledge Check

The Kahoot! logo is displayed in a large, white, bold, sans-serif font. The text is centered horizontally and vertically within a purple rectangular area. The background of this area is a blurred image of a modern office interior with a grid ceiling and glass partitions. The overall image has a dark blue background with a green vertical bar on the left side.

**Kahoot!**